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Abstract 
 
This study examines the implications of social discovery applications (apps) for the safety of 
their users and proposes proactive policies for firms to adopt to ensure greater safety. This report 
specifically focuses on female victims of technology-facilitated sexual violence and harassment 
on the basis that the research to date indicates that women and girls are disproportionately the 
victims of both sexual harassment and violence in offline contexts. Through an analysis of three 
cases of mobile app abuse, mobile industry security standards, and proactive versus reactive 
policies, the issues and alternatives are explored.  This research draws on journal articles, market 
research and competitor analysis to determine recommended security practices for social media 
apps. The recommendations were prepared for a BA 495 Honors Business Strategy Capstone 
client in spring quarter 2015. 
Spring 2015 BA 495 Client 
 
For the purpose of this paper, I will conceal the name of the client. From hence forth, the client, 
their product and any persons representing the client will be referred to with the pseudonym APP 
DEVELOPERS (APPD) or as “the client.” APPD is a mobile app developer team with a passion 
for the new phenomenon called social discovery, or “Social Media 2.0” as the client prefers to 
call it. Their product is a mobile app; it is an activity based real time social discovery app that 
allows users to filter what they want to do via words rather than images.  The app idea was 
conceived after the creative director of APPD travelled for business and found himself alone in a 
hotel room with no knowledge of the city and no one to connect with except old friends on 
Facebook. Instead of sharing experiences via social media, the app allows you to connect with 
others who share your passion and share experiences in real life. It is currently only available in 
iOS, but with an investor plan, the creators and company founders plan to expand into the 
android market as well.  
 
The following is an overview of the app provided by the client: “just tell the app what city you’re 
in, tap the activity keyword on the cloud, and watch a list of everyone in your immediate area 
who wants to engage in that activity appear. Time, date, location and even a profile of the user 
are at your fingertips so you can learn more about the activity, and the person who posted it, 
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before making contact” (APPD, 2015). APPD claims that because all information and contact is 
through the app’s interface, the user's identity is safe because “you reveal only the information 
you want, and only when you are ready” (APPD, 2015). 
What is Social Discovery? 
 
Social discovery is becoming a buzzword in describing new technologies and services. It is 
typically used in conjunction with social networking and/or mobile apps, but is not limited to 
such applications and may also include websites. Owen Thomas, Editor in Chief of Read Write, 
opened the 2014 Glimpse Social Discovery conference with this remark: ‘Social networking is 
what your social life looks like today, and social discovery is what your social life might look 
like tomorrow” (Kokalitcheva, 2014). Reinforcing this idea of real time experiences, APPD also 
tries to differentiate the social discovery phenomenon from social networking applications.  
 
According to APPD, social networking applications are a wonderful way to keep in touch with 
family, friends and high-school acquaintances. This differs from the real time opportunities that 
social discovery applications provide – the most common social discovery app are dating 
applications like Tinder. However unlike Tinder, APPD through their mobile app aims to 
connect the user with new people in a platonic way without the assumption that the user may 
want to be in a serious relationship with them. There are many benefits that social discovery 
tools offer to the public, but along with those benefits, there are also some substantial concerns 
with this kind of technology. An article on the Personal Protection Systems’ website states some 
users consider social discovery programs to be intrusive, and worry about privacy issues that 
accompany these types of technologies (Darren, 2012). This concern over privacy and personal 
safety is borne out in associated research as discussed in the next section.  
Literature Review 
 
This literature review discusses two critical aspects – one aspect is women’s concern of online 
and offline interaction and the second is possible correlations that leads to online victimization.  
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Online/Offline Concerns 
 
Peluchette (2013) discusses gender differences regarding the type of information posted online 
and whether or not students felt comfortable with employers seeing this information. The 
highlight of the article is that males indicate less concern towards sharing information online 
than females. Peluchette concludes saying that student are somewhat naïve about the potential 
negative consequences concerning the access and use of their information online. This is 
consistent with concern that young female adults are more likely to be taken advantage of online.  
 
However, Henry and Powell (2014) examined nonconsensual creation and distribution of sexual 
images as it relates to harassment, stalking and family or intimate violence that indicates adult 
women are just as frequently taken advantage of as young adults. They found that the boundaries 
of acceptable romantic behaviors and gender-based violence have expanded and overlapped, 
with the increase of online opportunities to harass and stalk users. The accessibility of user’s 
location can be used as an apparatus to monitor and/or control a partner. The article goes further 
into how technology enables perpetrators to send “a constant barrage of messages to a victim 
whether by phone, email and text messages, or tweets and posts on Facebook” (Henry and 
Powell, 2014, pg.114). Women’s support group members and volunteers describe cases where 
the messages are violent and threatening (such as threats to rape or kill). In addition to this, they 
found cases where the content of the messages appear harmless, but the frequency “carries 
particular meanings in the after- math of a sexual assault or violent relationship” (Henry and 
Powell, 2014, pg.110). Similar to experiences reported by youth abused via technology, adult 
women who are targets of sexual partner violence and harassment online find that it is not as 
simple as not going online. One concern is that communications and new media technologies 
have become so embedded in any kind of social participation and connections that it is difficult 
for those escaping relationship violence and abuse to not encounter some form of connection 
with their abuser. Their article argues that harmful digital communications often are framed as 
user naiveté rather than gender-based violence and that is something that needs to be addressed 
should there be progress (Henry, 2014).  
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Another crucial paper is Henson (2013); the paper used data from a sample of undergraduate 
students from the University of Cincinnati to “analyze both the extent of fear of cyberstalking 
victimization and the link between cyberstalking victimization, perceived risk of cyberstalking 
victimization, and fear of cyberstalking victimization” (Henson, 2013). As a result of this study 
Henson found that a large number of users are afraid of experiencing cyberstalking victimization 
– and that gender (among other aspects) had a major impact on the level of fear reported. The 
paper that found that 61% of females (vs. 22% of males) reported being fearful; females have a 
higher mean level of total fear of crime, and that women fear rape more than they fear murder 
(Henson, 2013, pg. 20). Of the 516 female respondents, 31.0% were afraid of being cyberstalked 
by an intimate partner, 30.6% were afraid of being cyberstalked by a friend/acquaintance, and 
56.6% were afraid of being cyberstalked by a stranger. Gender is positively and significantly 
related to fear of cyberstalking by a stranger. The direction of this relationship indicates that 
women are more fearful of cyberstalking by a stranger than men. Men fear being hacked, while 
women fear bodily harm. (Henson, 2013). 
 
Online Victimization 
 
Henson (2011) examined the relationship between users’ online social network activity, online 
social network security, and online interpersonal victimization and found that users who engaged 
in risky online behaviors, such as opening numerous social network accounts and adding 
strangers as friends, were more likely to be victimized online. Another article by one of 
Henson’s associates, Bradford Reyns, was used as background information in Henson’s research. 
Reyns (2010) finds that the number of online social networks an individual owns, the number of 
daily updates to those networks, use of instant messaging services, allowing strangers to access 
personal information online, using online services designed to monitor online network activity, 
engaging in online deviance, and low self-control are significant predictors of cyberstalking 
victimization. Reyns’ suggests moderate support for lifestyle/routine activities theory in 
explaining cyberstalking. Finally, Wolak et al. (2008) discusses Internet sex crimes involving 
adults and juveniles more often fit a model of statutory rape—adult offenders who meet, develop 
relationships with, and openly seduce underage teenagers—than a model of forcible sexual 
assault or pedophilic child molesting. She also says that particular attention should be paid to 
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higher risk youths, including those with histories of sexual abuse, sexual orientation concerns, 
and patterns of off- and online risk taking.  
 
These last three articles have large gaps in their logic, and are the epitome of victim blaming. 
While there may be correlations of offline behaviors to online and offline victimization, the 
solutions should not be paying attention to higher risk users with a history of online and offline 
risks. This paper does not support these last three viewpoints, and instead focuses on companies 
creating proactive and preventive measures that will help users feel secure while using mobile 
applications, whether or not they are prone to risky behaviors.  
Who are Possible Victims 
Thorough an examination of industry trends in the app sector coupled with data surrounding 
sexual assault, the characteristics of potential victims of online predators emerge.  
 
Industry Report 
 
Mintel’s consumer survey data show that teenage girls are four percentage points more likely 
than teenage boys to use mobile apps on their cell phones (68% vs. 64%, respectively) (Harland, 
2014). Similarly, older teens aged fifteen to seventeen are five percentage points more likely than 
those aged twelve to fourteen to use mobile apps (69% vs. 64%, respectively) (Harland, 2014). 
Among teens, girls aged fifteen to seventeen exhibit elevated levels of app downloading. Social 
media apps are the most popular type, with two thirds of teens aged twelve to seventeen claimed 
to use them on their mobile phone on a daily basis (Harland, 2014).  
 
As with overall mobile app use, avid users in the social networking category are older teenage 
girls. Seventy-four percent of girls and 75% of teens aged fifteen to seventeen use social 
networking apps daily (Hartland, 2014). Older teens and teenage girls also show a somewhat 
higher frequency of daily usage of social discovery communication apps than younger teens and 
teenage boys. Mintel lists the most popular apps including Snapchat, Kik, and FaceTime 
(Harland, 2014). While other users are just as much in danger of predators, minors are frequently 
targeted online as well. 
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Sexual Assault on Women & Teens 
 
A study from the UNH Crimes against Children Research Center finds that sex offenders who 
target teens increasingly use Internet and cell phone communications to lure teens into sexual 
relationships. In crimes that involve such communications, offenders who meet and recruit youth 
online operate in much the same way as offenders who meet and know youth in ordinary offline 
environments (UNH Media, 2013). Approximately one in five women in the United States have 
been raped at some point in their life, including forced and attempted forced penetration and 
alcohol/drug facilitated penetration, according to a 2010 Center for Disease Control survey 
(Tjaden, 2000). Additionally, the rate of sexual assaults is alarmingly high among adolescents. 
Research from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institute of 
Justice finds that 30% to 35% of female sexual assault survivors are first raped between the ages 
of eleven to seventeen. A second statistic echoes the two previous findings: it states that 42% of 
female rape victims experienced their first rape before the age of 18 (Black, 2011). This second 
statistic includes rape before eleven years of age as well. This is an alarming range of ages and 
frequency.  
 
To understand how sexual predators use technology, additional studies were analyzed. 
Approximately one in seven (13%) youth Internet users receive unwanted sexual solicitations 
annually in the United States (Wolak et al., 2008). One in 25 youths received an online sexual 
solicitation in which the solicitor tried to make offline contact and in more than one-quarter 
(27%) of incidents, solicitors asked youths for sexual photographs of themselves (Wolak et al., 
2008).  Nine percent of youth Internet users had been exposed to distressing sexual material 
while online (Wolak et al., 2006) with approximately 15% of cell-owning teens (12–17) say they 
have received sexually suggestive nude/seminude images of someone they know via text 
(Lenhart, 2009). Nearly 40% of young people in a relationship have experienced at least one 
form of sexual abuse via technology (Tompson, 2013). The most common first encounter of a 
predator with an Internet-initiated sex crimes victim takes place in an online chat room (76%) 
(Wolak et al., 2010). Finally, seventy-two percent of teenagers and young adults believe that 
digital abuse is something that must be addressed by society and public officials (Wolak et al., 
2010).  
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Social Media and the Law 
 
Adolescent sexual assaults are particularly likely to go viral on social media sites/applications 
(more so than instances of adult rape) because of the close interactions via middle school and 
high school classrooms (Campbell, 2011). Blaming the victim “is a traditional problem that's 
being amplified because it's so easy to share and everyone is connected all of the time,” says 
Thomas Wold, a doctoral candidate in psychology at Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology. The ubiquity of cellphones with cameras and the power of the Internet make it 
easier for information to be available which then feed into the usual strategies for blaming the 
victims and character assassination of victims (Fuchs, 2013). Other data reflect the subsequent 
legal ramifications of cases brought against alleged sexual predators. A National Institute of 
Justice study found that among adolescent sexual assault victims who did file a police report 
(this includes meeting with investigators, going through a medical forensic exam and forensic 
evidence collection kit) nearly two-thirds of these cases were not prosecuted by the criminal 
justice system (Campbell 2011). 
 
Among adults, these rates are even worse. Based on six national programs, on average, 86% of 
sexual assaults that are reported to the police are never passed along to prosecutors even to be 
considered for prosecution (Campbell 2013). These cases were not forwarded to prosecutors for 
three major reasons: 1) police said there was insufficient evidence; 2) the police thought the 
victim was making a false report and 3) the victim was deemed as not credible, despite the fact 
that all of these victims had a sexual assault medical forensic exam and forensic evidence 
collection kit (rape kit). These cases were closed with either no investigation at all, or minimal 
investigational effort. A recent report from Human Rights Watch indicates this is an alarmingly 
common practice (“Capitol Offense,” 2013). Victims have very little hope of actually seeing 
their attacker incarcerated. The topics of legal and social justice are left for future research, but it 
is vital for app developers to prevent situations that would allow these attacks to happen. 
Three Case Studies 
To establish how online predation can occur, three case studies are examined as they relate to the 
client, and APPD’s future goals. 
Meneely pg. 10 
 
 
Case 1 Carly Ryan 
 
The story of Carly Ryan begins in 2006 when Carly, who was fifteen years old at the time, 
thought she had met her Mr. Right online. Brandon Kane was an eighteen-year-old musician 
from Melbourne, Australia. Except, Brandon Kane was a fictitious persona for Gary Francis 
Newman, a fifty year old predator and pedophile. Carly Ryan, believing her interactions with the 
Brandon alias online, feel in love during a period of eighteen months of emails, messaging and 
phone calls. When Gary Newman tried to seduce her in person, attending Carly’s birthday party 
pretending to be Brandon’s father “Shane,” Carly rejected him telling her mother that he was 
making her and her friends uncomfortable. Newman returned to Melbourne angry, and contacted 
Carly through his fictitious son Brandon. In February 2007, Newman lured Carly to meet him, 
under the guise of Brandon wanting to meet her. He met Carly in a secluded beach at Port Elliot, 
South Australia where he murdered Carly Ryan (“Carly’s Story,” 2010). While dated this case is 
one of the worst cases regarding social application/media predation and cat help the client 
understand the danger of meeting through online communications. Their app could possibly aid a 
criminal like Gary Newman to prey, rape and murder women and minors.  
 
Case 2 Skout; a Flirting App 
 
It required several years for the startup mobile app, Skout, to create and implement a feasible 
business model. The app’s original business model was very similar to Foursquare’s location 
check-in service, but after noticing that minors frequented the app, the company changed their 
business model to a flirting app that allows users to contact nearby strangers. The company even 
started a separate, more protected, yet similar service for thirteen to seventeen year olds. Despite 
the preventive measures Skout took to protect their underage users, in 2012 three men were 
accused of raping children they met using the mobile app designed for flirting between adults. 
Thinking that they had sufficient safeguards implemented, the rape indictments shocked the 
mobile app’s managers and leadership team. 
 
In each rape allegation, the men were suspected of masquerading as teenagers. In one case, a 15-
year-old Ohio girl said a 37-year-old man had raped her. In the second, a 24-year-old man is 
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accused of raping a 12-year-old girl in California and in the third, a 21-year-old man from 
Wisconsin, sexually assaulted a 13-year-old boy. Christian Wiklund, Skout’s founder, said he 
had the business halt the app for teenagers, who he said made up a significant portion of its 
member base, and banned all their devices (one of the app’s requirements is to register with the 
app using unique device numbers). He said his development and management team were 
working with a task force of security experts to scrutinize company practices and improve age 
verification. “I thought we were doing a lot, but obviously we have to do better,” said Scott 
Weiss, an investment partner. “This is a five-alarm fire. The entire company is re-evaluating 
everything its doing” (Perlroth, 2012). 
 
While this case study serves as a cautionary tale, the important aspects of this case study is that 
Skout reinstated their application for minors after working on their security. The following are 
Skout’s solutions: 
1. Age Verification: users under 18 must now sign in through Facebook Connect, which 
will allow, according to them, to do social proofing.   
2. Location: Skout has redesigned the app so that teen users can communicate with other 
teen users who are at least 100 miles away from them.  
3. Teens and Adults: “We are going to be more vigilant than ever in deploying our 
technology and our community managers to screen teenagers from the over-18 
community and keep the two groups separate” (Wiklund, 2013).   
4. Policy Violations: this means if a user steps over the line when interacting with other 
users, they will be banned (Wiklund, 2013).  
These are a great starting point for the client to consider however not all are feasible for the 
client at this time. For example, how does Skout take into account that users may create fake 
Facebook accounts with fake ages? Additionally, some of the solutions created by Skout would 
not work for the client as these solutions do not generate revenue nor does it allow people to 
meet in real life to do real things, which is the focus of the client’s app.  Skout’s solutions are 
moving forward with verifying users and encouraging users to keep distance from unverified or 
potentially dangerous users. While a strong solution, a company like Skout, which has had many 
years to grow revenue and a loyal fan base, has access to financial resources that would allow 
them to keep these solutions going. For a company that still needs funding and other resources, it 
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does not make sense for the client to invest in these measures at this time. However, it is 
appropriate to consider proactive measures that could lead to widespread adoption of the app to 
help with company success.  
 
Case 3 Predators Using Online Dating Target Women 
 
Geelong is the second-most populated metropolitan area in the Australian state, Victoria. 
Geelong police have revealed they have investigated "more than a dozen" reports of rape and 
indecent assault in 2013 linked to matchmaking sites. Police officials reported an increase of 
rape and assault cases. According to a local news article, a detective from the sex offences unit 
urged women to be vigilant and avoid meeting strangers in secluded locations, "…unfortunately 
some people in this area have had really bad experiences and there's been some nasty sexual 
assaults reported," he said. A frequently used dating site in Geelong offers only this warning: 
“We understand that no two people are the same, so we offer a range of services that help you 
date the way you want," the website states. "You acknowledge that you use the ... site at your 
own risk” (Pearson, 2013).  
 
The client is considering global expansion, which is why this article is important for APPD to 
think critically about their security position given international variation in online predation. On 
a global scale, removing sexual predators from dating websites is impossible, seeing that many 
websites are based overseas. Many alleged offenders could remain undetected online, despite 
past convictions or active investigations. For example, Australia does not formally have any 
memorandum of understanding with overseas companies (Pearson, 2013). Because of this, police 
officials do not have the ability to remove a name from the app or website, even if the person has 
been indicted or incarcerated. Consequently, officials are forced to warn users that they need to 
do as much research as they can on the person they are meeting with and make sure to inform 
someone else that they are meeting (Pearson, 2013).  
Risk Management Approach 
 
To inform the decision-making process of app companies regarding their policies association 
with online predation, a risk management framework can be employed. Typically, risk 
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management plans have three objectives: to eliminate negative risks, to accept the risk and to 
mitigate the risk. To eliminate a risk an organization would need to use whatever financial 
resources it takes to eliminate the risk. One options under the eliminate risk category is to simply 
avoid the risk; risks that would be better avoided are those with a high likelihood of loss and 
large financial impact on the organization. However, organizations must be aware of the fact that 
risk cannot fully be eliminated and thus must be tolerated to a certain extent. To accept a risk is 
to reduce risks to an "acceptable" level if risks cannot be eliminated. This means that the risk 
level of the organization is within an acceptable and manageable range with proper controls and 
processes in effect to keep it as such. If the cost to mitigate risk is higher than cost to bear the 
risk, then the best response is to accept and continually monitor the risk. A frequent response to 
mitigate risks is to transfer the risk, although the two options are quite different. Activities with a 
high likelihood of occurring, but with some financial impact are those that can be mitigated.  On 
the other hand, activities with low probability of occurring, but with large financial impact are 
those that should be transferred. Organizations may transfer risks by means of insurance, or they 
transfer the risk to another organization (for example, using a third-party vendor to install 
network equipment so that the vendor is responsible for the installation's success or failure). It is 
common industry practice within mobile apps to transfer the risks, when actually companies 
should be mitigating the risks to protect their users. In any case, organizations must consider 
ranking risks based on financial impact and likelihood of occurrence.  
 
Once risks are identified, the next step is to determine the likelihood that the potential 
vulnerability can be exploited. There are various techniques that may be used including but not 
limited to probability trees, expected value, Pareto analysis, and probability impact grids. 
Probability trees provide graphic depictions of possible risk events shown as linked rectangles 
each with a probability and impact (Litten, 2009). These help the decision-makers to determine 
possible outcomes, and ensures suitable actions can be implemented. Expected value multiplies 
the cost of the risk impact with the probability of the risk occurring. This is helpful in 
determining a potential Risk Budget. Pareto Analysis, often called the 80/20 rule, identifies all 
risks and then orders them by highest impact and how likely the risk will happen. The idea is that 
20% of the risks will have the most impact on a project, and thus advises management to focus 
attention on the highest priority risk. The Pareto Analysis gives the best risk return on investment 
Meneely pg. 14 
 
(Litten, 2009). The probability impact grid is a table with the vertical axis scaled in probability 
and the horizontal axis scaled in impact. The grid is used to provide an assessment of the severity 
of a risk and so enable risks to be ranked such that management effort can be prioritized (Litten, 
2009).  
 
In the IT industry, (part of mobile apps is coding and IT management) risk management consists 
of risk assessments, risk mitigation, and continuous risk evaluations and assessments 
(Stoneburner, 2002). In the risk assessment phase organizations, or third parties, identify and 
evaluate each risk, the impact of the risks and provide recommendations. The risk mitigation 
phase comprises prioritizing, implementing, and maintaining appropriate measures that are 
recommended in the risk assessment process. The ongoing risk evaluation and assessment phase 
forces organizations to continuously re-evaluate their risk management activities in reducing 
risks. Risk assessments are proven beneficial if they are the first step in an IT risk management 
initiative (Edmead, 2007). 
 
Implementing a good proactive security strategy must include identifying and addressing 
exploitable weaknesses rather than doing Band-Aid fixes. It is crucial to assess the real impact of 
potential attacks by using one of the techniques discussed above and to allocate financial and 
human capital to address critical risks. By practicing risk management, it allows organizations to 
be proactive in their security policies instead of stuck in a reactive mindset.  
Market Research: Competitor Disclosures (Reactive) 
 
Just as every organization takes measures to avert future losses, organizations must also have 
procedures in place to respond to losses when proactive measures were either underdeveloped or 
not effective. Reactive methods in the mobile industry include but are not limited to legal 
disclosures, transferring risks to insurances and providing opportunities to flag users. Having an 
appropriate set of reactive responses prepared and ready to implement is important; however, in 
regard to human capital such as users and customers, it is important to advocate and continuously 
create and update proactive measures. If an organization does not do this, they may lose financial 
assets through litigation or more importantly lose a loyal consumer base. This section discusses 
examples of a reactive approach as it relates to the clients competitors. 
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The following is the APPD’s disclosure: “You agree to use the software at your sole risk and that 
APPD shall not have any liability to you for content that may be found to be offensive, indecent, 
or objectionable. … In no event shall APPD be liable for any damages whatsoever whether 
direct, indirect, general, special, compensatory, consequential, and/or incidental, arising out of 
or relating to the conduct of you or anyone else in connection with the use of the software or the 
services including without limitation, bodily injury, emotional distress, and/or any other 
damages resulting from communications or meetings with other user of the software or the 
services” (APPD, 2015, my italics). This disclosure is the epitome of reactive measures, as most 
disclosures are – it does not offer any solutions or preemptive processes that protect users against 
attacks or damages. See below for examples of industry standards for user security.  
 
Competitor 1 MeetUp 
 
The following is MeetUp’s legal disclosure regarding meetings outside/offline. It is available 
through their website. “Because we do not supervise or control the Meetup Group Meetings or 
interactions among or between members of Meetup Groups or Meetup Everywheres and other 
persons or companies … you agree that you bear all risk and you agree to release us … from 
claims, demands, and damages (actual and consequential) of every kind and nature, known and 
unknown, suspected and unsuspected, disclosed and undisclosed, now and in the future, arising 
out of or in any way connected with your use of the Platform, your Third Party Transactions, or 
the actions of you or other persons at, a Meetup Gathering. You further waive any and all rights 
and benefits otherwise conferred by any statutory or non-statutory law of any jurisdiction that 
would purport to limit the scope of a release or waiver. You waive and relinquish all rights and 
benefits which you have or may have under Section 1542 of the Civil Code of the State of 
California or any similar provision of the statutory or non-statutory law of any other jurisdiction 
(including without limitation the states of Missouri, Delaware and Pennsylvania) to the full 
extent that you may lawfully waive all such rights and benefits” (MeetUp, 2015, my italics). 
 
Competitor 2 Tinder 
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The following is Tinder’s terms of use/legal disclosure provided via their website: “You are 
solely responsible for your interactions with other users. You understand that the company 
currently does not conduct criminal background checks or screenings on its users. In no event 
shall the Company, its affiliates or its partners be liable (directly or indirectly) for any losses or 
damages whatsoever, whether direct, indirect, general, special, compensatory, consequential, 
and/or incidental, arising out of or relating to the conduct of you or anyone else in connection 
with the use of the Service including, without limitation, death, bodily injury, emotional distress, 
and/or any other damages resulting from communications or meetings with other users or 
persons you meet through the Service. You agree to take all necessary precautions in all 
interactions with other users, particularly if you decide to communicate off the Service or meet in 
person, or if you decide to send money to another user” (Tinder, 2015, my italics).  
 
The italicized text in each example summarizes common approaches to user security within the 
mobile app industry. Additional research conducted on numerous competitors’ revealed similar 
disclosures, supporting that reactive approaches are the industry norm for user security and 
protection. This a potential competitive advantage for APPD to pursue, by being able to provide 
measures that help users be safe offline, it will help create a loyal consumer base willing to pay 
 and support a company that keeps them safe.   
Security Recommendations (Proactive) 
 
Many organizations realize the value of dedicating resources to the prevention of damages that 
are likely occur. For example, mobile banks use encrypted websites and authentication methods 
to prevent and detect a person other than the account holder is attempting to access account 
information. Websites such as PayPal verify users by requesting bank account verification to add 
and/or change financial amounts. A proactive approach allows organizations to manage the 
security of their infrastructures and the business values (Wirth, 2009). On the other hand, it is 
difficult to verify and prevent attacks that happen offline. A company can however; take 
proactive measures to minimize the way predators may be able to abuse their technology to hurt 
others.  
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The first recommendation is to improve APPD’s image, reputation and support community 
groups. Security is not advertised by social discovery apps very extensively, so it could be a 
boon for APPD to create open and transparent communication with their users.  Letting their 
users know that the company's main interest is to provide not only a fun experience but also a 
safe experience could provide a unique competitive advantage. Additionally, following a risk 
management proactive approach will allow APPD to understand what risks the app holds and 
where the main points of security concerns reside.  
 
The second recommendation is to contact several risk management companies that specialize in 
app security. The best risk management companies will not only determine the risks of security 
breaches of personal and private information but will also look at privacy policies and determine 
how to best respond to users concerns about security. 
 
The third recommendation is to go beyond the flagging and blocking methods used for user 
verification and validation by allowing users to rate each other and events they participate in. 
Like eBay, users would be able to anonymously rate another user or event based on a certain set 
criteria. Additionally, offering a verified user status (such as Twitter or YouTube) via 
background checks may ease user’s wariness to meet offline. In this case, most users would be 
unverified however, should a user request verification of the person they are connection with 
through the apps, APPD could then conduct a background check or reimburse a user if they 
decided to get a background check. A security example of this function is not allowing underage 
users to connect offline with unverified users. While there are many dangers online, terrible 
events can happen offline and if APPD has a process that discourages minors meeting with 
unverified users, it will be a great advantage for them.  
 
Finally, if APPD were to pursue an alternative revenue model that would charge groups, for 
example, members of a sports team, this could provide a layer of safety if only members of the 
groups could connect through the app. If APPD were to create a small groups function, this 
would allow users to create their own group and have the ability to only interact with that one 
group, multiple groups (if they’re invited), or with everyone using the app.  APPD would be able 
to charge monthly dues to groups and generate revenue while allowing their users safer 
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groupings that are limited to pre-set membership such as local running, cycling, or tourist 
groups. Another revenue generating option is collaborating with closed networks such as 
associations, universities or conferences to create another tab or screen that would allow people 
to connect with users in the same association. This would be available again through a 
subscription fee to the association; users would then be able to log in to the app through their 
secure single sign-on and secure connections.  
 
The findings of this research demonstrate the need for social discovery app developers to 
consider the safety of their users and adopt policies that shift from reactive to proactive 
approaches. Industry research was conducted, case studies analyzed and recommendations for 
the BA 495 Honors Business Strategy Capstone client were proposed with hope that the client 
will take these ideas into consideration as they grow as a socially responsible business.   
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